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This paper aims to explain the sharp rise in unhedged foreign borrowing by South East
Asian corporations in the few years prior to the crisis despite remarkably little change
in fundamentals. The crucial element of our story is the strategic interaction between
firms and the central bank, which gives rise to multiple equilibria: when firms use
foreign borrowing, they raise the cost of devaluation to the central bank, which in turn
makes foreign borrowing more attractive. Consequently, a small shock to
fundamentals may have a large and permanent effect on the equilibrium composition
of firms' borrowing.
Keywords: Foreign borrowing; Asian crisis
JEL classification: E58, F34
                                                
1 Ai-Ting Goh is affiliated to the Université catholique de Louvain, IRES and the National University of
Singapore, Jacques Olivier to the HEC School of Management and to CEPR. We would like to thank
Bernard Dumas and Uli Hege for helpful discussions on related topics, participants to seminars at
ESSEC, Namur, and the Université catholique de Louvain for valuable comments on an earlier draft.
The first author is grateful for the financial support from the Belgian French Community's program
'Action de Recherches Concertée' 99/04-235. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial
support from a HEC research grant. The usual disclaimer applies. Please send all correspondence to Ai
Ting Goh, Département des Sciences Economiques, Université Catholique de Louvain, 3 Place
Montesquieu, 1348 Louvain La Neuve, Belgium; e-mail: goh@ires.ucl.ac.be1
I) Introduction
A few years after the onset of speculative attacks against Asian currencies and the
subsequent economic crisis, much remains to be understood about the reasons for the
attacks and for the magnitude of the crisis. Arguably, the single most important factor
aggravating the crisis has been the enormous amount of foreign currency denominated
borrowing by local corporations and financial institutions prior to the crisis. Table 1
shows that foreign bank lending to Asian banks and corporations had been steadily
rising prior to the crisis, constituted mostly of short term loans, and frequently
exceeded the total level of the country's reserves of foreign currencies. According to
IMF, external financing (including bond financing) for Asian countries has tripled
between 1992 and 1996
2. Furthermore, the bulk of this exposure to foreign currency
risk remained  unhedged
3.  Unhedged exposure to currency risk is central to many
theories of the Asian crisis
4 and has indeed contributed to the amplification of the
crisis in at least two ways. First, and most obviously, it led to a much increased debt
burden of Asian banks and corporations after the devaluation of local currencies.
Second, it was condusive of a Diamond-Dybvig (1983) type of liquidity crisis as short
run liabilities exceeded short term assets and lenders refused to roll over the loans.
At this date, two explanations for the huge exposure to currency risk of Asian firms
have been suggested. The first explanation simply is that local firms underestimated
the risk of devaluation. For instance, the IMF International Capital Markets Report
                                                
2 See e.g. Figure 12, p.30, 1997 IMF International Capital Markets Report.
3 According to the IMF, the limited development of currency derivative markets in these countries has
been a deliberate policy choice as local authorities feared that currency futures and options could be a
vehicle for taking speculative positions and could increase exchange rate volatility (see e.g., IMF
International Capital Markets Report, 1998, pp. 77). See also Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000)
for reference to further evidence.
4 See e.g. Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000), Chang and Velasco (1999) and Krugman (1999)2
(1998) states that: "large interest rate differentials [between local and foreign
borrowing] created a strong incentive for external borrowing, especially when firms
regarded the authorities' ability to sustain their exchange rate arrangements as
credible". However, this argument is not entirely convincing. First, from a theoretical
standpoint, the existence of a spread between domestic and foreign interest rates is
incompatible with the principle of no arbitrage unless agents actually anticipate that a
devaluation may take place with positive probability. Second, the spread between
domestic and foreign interest rates reached a peak in 1990/1991 while the sharp
increase in foreign borrowing took place only in the mid-90's after the magnitude of
the spread had already gone down. Third,
 most of the financial liberalization in the
region took place before 1990 so that the local firms could have already taken
advantage of the large spreads in the early 90's
5. Finally, the evolution of credit ratings
of Asian credit risk during the 90's suggests little change in the way the risk of Asian
borrowers was perceived on international financial markets
6. In short, there is little
evidence of any change in fundamentals large enough to motivate a surge in unhedged
foreign borrowing in Asia during the mid-90's.
A second, more appealing, explanation for the exposure to currency risk of Asian
firms relies on moral hazard considerations, according to which banks or corporations
borrowed externally on the basis of implicit or explicit guarantees by the state. This
argument was first brought forward by Krugman (1998). However, at the same time,
Radelet and Sachs (1998) pointed out several weaknesses of the moral hazard story:
first, one would expect banks to be more often protected by bail-out promises than
non-bank corporations. Yet, we observe that the bulk of foreign lending in Asia was
                                                
5 For these two points, see e.g. Johnston, Darbar and Echeverria (1997)
6 See e.g. 67
th and 68th Annual Reports of the BIS3
aimed at non-bank corporations
7 (with the exception of South Korea). Second, even
the evidence among non-bank corporations is inconsistent with the moral hazard story
as many firms that were too small or unrelated to the government to expect ex-post
bail out were able to and did obtain foreign financing prior to the crisis. Finally, from
an ex-post point of view, we observe that many of the firms that borrowed abroad have
already gone into bankruptcy or are currently facing bankruptcy.
We suggest in this paper that the surge in the exposure to currency risk by Asian
corporations may have been the equilibrium outcome of strategic interactions between
firms and the central bank even in the absence of explicit or implicit promises of bail-
out. We support this suggestion through a model where firms' financing choices and
the central bank's decision to defend the currency are jointly determined. Firms decide
upon the optimal amount of foreign financing for a fixed size investment project
depending on their expectations of the risk of devaluation. We assume that the cost of
financing born by local firms enters negatively into the central bank's objective
function. The central bank decides whether it should devalue by comparing the cost of
raising domestic interest rates to defend the currency with the cost of devaluation. If
firms expect that the central bank has strong incentives to defend the currency, they
choose to finance their projects with mostly foreign borrowing, thus raising the cost of
devaluation to the central bank and the incentives for other firms to use foreign
borrowing. This creates a complementarity between the decisions of the different local
firms. An implication is the possibility of multiple equilibria, characterized by vastly
different financing decisions of firms. A jump from a low to a high foreign borrowing
equilibrium may be caused by even a small change in fundamentals. The impact on
                                                
7 See Table 14
foreign borrowing will be especially large when firms behave strategically and realize
the role their financing decisions play in the central bank's decision-making. Hence,
high foreign borrowing may have arisen in South East Asia because of a slightly
different moral hazard problem from the one emphasized in the existing literature, i.e.
because of firms trying to change the ex-ante incentives of the central bank to devalue
rather than expecting "ex-post" bail-out in case of a devaluation.
Note that our explanation of the high level of foreign currency denominated debt
incurred by the South East Asian firms does not rely on firms systematically under-
estimating the risk of devaluation. On the contrary, the decisions of the firms are
motivated by a full understanding of the trade-offs faced by the central bank. It is
widely recognized that, in the recent Asian crisis as well as in other crises, central
banks were confronted with a difficult policy dilemma (see for instance Corsetti et. al.
1998 or Dornbush 1998). On the one hand, the weak economy and the collapse of the
real estate and asset prices, which weakened the banking sector's portfolio, made
raising interest rates very costly. On the other hand, keeping interest rates low at the
cost of a devaluation of the local currency would cause the bankruptcy of the many
firms that had incurred significant foreign debt. In the case of Thailand, the central
bank committed substantial reserves to the defense of the currency and raised the
interest rate before finally giving up the peg. In this paper, we postulate, first, that
central banks were, as far as possible, trying to minimize the losses incurred by local
firms borrowing on foreign capital markets and, second, that these agents perfectly
understood their importance for the local authorities.
We are not alone in viewing the high level of foreign borrowing in Asia as an
equilibrium phenomenon. A much related paper to ours is Burnside, Eichenbaum and5
Rebelo (2000) who argue, as we do, that Asian institutions voluntarily exposed
themselves to currency risk as an optimal response to incentives provided by the
central bank. However, our analysis differs from theirs in two dimensions. First, they
suggest that the incentives provided by the central bank took the form of ex-post bail-
out guarantees, which is subject to the Radelet and Sachs (1998) critiques mentioned
earlier. Second, while their model can explain a high level of exposure of Asian firms
to currency risk prior to the crisis, it cannot explain why that level changed so
dramatically between 1992 and 1996 despite remarkably little change in the economic,
financial and political environment in Asia during that period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the basic model.
Section III solves for the equilibrium with competitive firms. Section IV analyzes the
impact of the presence of strategic agents on the equilibrium. Section V concludes.
II) The Model
The model is a two-period model with two types of optimizing agents:  n firm
managers who try to find the optimal mix of foreign and domestic borrowing to
finance a fixed size investment project, and the central bank that must decide on
whether to defend a fixed exchange rate. As we wish to focus on the interplay between
the optimal decisions of these two types of agents while keeping the model tractable,
we do not explicitly model the optimization problem of other agents in the economy,
namely, foreign investors and local firms that do not have access to foreign capital
markets. However, and as will become apparent later in the paper, we impose only
mild assumptions about reduced form specifications of the behavior of these agents.6
Firm managers try to minimize the utility cost of financing a project of a fixed size.
The utility function of the firm managers is assumed to be quadratic so that they
behave in a risk-averse fashion. The financing decision involves the choice between
two instruments, foreign or domestic borrowing, which are infinitely divisible. The
domestic interest rate is fixed (endogenously) by the central bank at the beginning of
each period, before firms make their financing decisions. Domestic borrowing is
riskless. Foreign borrowing however, entails a currency risk associated with the
possibility that the central bank may choose to devalue when the economy is hit by a
stochastic shock to the demand for foreign reserves.
 The other agent in the economy is the central bank. The central bank is able to
maintain the fixed exchange rate through adjusting domestic interest rates.
8 At the
beginning of each period, the economy is subjected to a shock to the demand for the
central bank's reserves
9. It is assumed that, ceteris paribus, the demand for foreign
currency reserves is strictly decreasing in the domestic interest rate. Hence, it is
equivalent to think of the shock to the demand for the central bank reserves as a shock
to the domestic interest rate which the central bank needs to set to maintain the fixed
exchange rate
10. Should the cost of maintaining the fixed exchange rate prove to be too
large, the central bank can give up the peg, in which case the currency is devalued by a
                                                
8 We thus follow Obstfeld (1994) in modeling the central bank's decision problem as a trade-off between
the cost of high interest rate (to maintain the fixed exchange rate) and the cost of opting out of the fixed
exchange rate system.
9 Since our objective is not to explain what triggered the Asian crisis but rather to understand financing
decisions that occurred before the crisis, we shall not take a stand as to the origins of a shock large
enough to force the central bank to devalue. It may either originate from a shock to fundamentals as in
first generation models of currency crises (Krugman, 1979) or, more likely in the Asian crisis case, from
a shift in expectations moving the economy to a new equilibrium (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994)
10 Note that this interest rate is fixed before firms make their financing decisions. Hence, we are
implicitly assuming that borrowing of local firms is negligible compared to the overall demand for
central bank reserves.7
fixed percentage. In deciding whether to maintain the peg or not, the central bank has
to trade off between two opposing costs. On the one hand, high domestic interest rates
(are exogenously assumed to) have a negative impact on the domestic economy
11. On
the other hand, devaluation hurts firms that financed part of their projects with foreign
loans. The larger the fraction of the projects which is financed by foreign currency
loans the greater the cost of devaluation to the central bank. The central bank thus
chooses to opt out when the costs imposed by the level of interest rate necessary to
support the peg outweigh the cost of the increased burden of external debt on firms in
the event of devaluation.
We first summarize the timing of events before describing the firms' and the




a) Realization of a stochastic shock to the demand for foreign reserves.
b) The central bank decides on whether to devalue or not and thus determines the level
of the current period domestic interest rate 
d r0 .
c) Firms decide on the amount of foreign borrowing at rate 
w
o r and of the amount of
domestic borrowing at rate 
d
o r .
                                                
11 For instance, and of relevance in the South East Asian case, by raising the cost of borrowing for firms
or agents that do not have access to foreign capital markets.8
End of period:
Firms receive borrowed funds and use them for their (fixed sized) investment project.
Period 1
Beginning of period:
a) Realization of a stochastic shock to the demand for foreign reserves.
b) The central bank decides on whether to devalue or not and thus determines the level
of the current period domestic interest rate 
d r1 .
End of period:
Investment projects pay off and firms reimburse their debt and the world ends.
Firms' Financing Decision
Each representative firm must finance an investment project of a fixed size, which
we normalize to 1. At time 0, the firm chooses the optimal proportion of domestic
versus foreign financing by solving the following problem:
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where  ) ; ( e f C is the cost of financing the project if a fraction  f of the project is
financed through foreign currency denominated loans. The quadratic term in problem
(1) captures the risk aversion of the firm managers with A indicating the coefficient of
risk aversion.  ) ; ( e f C is given by:






= e , and e0 and e1 are the exchange rates (domestic currency per unit of
foreign currency) prevailing in the first and second period, respectively. Note that e0
and 
d r0  are determined before the firm makes its financing decision and are thus taken
as exogenous by the firm. For convenience and without loss of generality, we
normalize the foreign interest rate, 
w r0 , to zero
12. As a consequence, the correct
interpretation of 
d r0  in our model is that of a spread of domestic interest rates over
foreign interest rates. We also make the following assumption about the activity of
firms:
Assumption 1
Firms are not allowed to lend money, neither on foreign nor on local markets so that:
f˛[0,1].
Finally, we make the following important remark :
Remark 1
Firm's decisions remain unchanged at the equilibrium if we introduce a futures market
on foreign currency
Remark 1 holds because futures contracts are a redundant asset given the assets
already available in the economy. By the principle of no arbitrage, it must be strictly
equivalent at the equilibrium to borrow in foreign currency and hedge the exposure to
                                                
12 Since we have not assumed limited liability there is no reason for the interest rate charged by the
lender to be contingent on the firm's decision. In a setting with limited liability, one could defend the
same assumption on the grounds that f is not directly observable by the lender.10
currency risk or to borrow domestically. Hence, one can think of the decision variable
f as either foreign borrowing given that no derivative market exists or, equivalently, as
the share of borrowing that the firm has optimally decided to keep  unhedged to
currency risk if currency derivatives are available.
The Central Bank's Problem
At the beginning of the second period, a random shock to the central bank's
reserves occurs. We may interpret the shock as a speculative attack on the currency. If
the central bank chooses to maintain the current exchange rate it has to raise the
interest rate to a level sufficient to attract foreign investment into the country. We note
by 
d r1  the level of domestic interest rates necessary to maintain the fixed exchange rate
at t=1. 
d r1  is a random variable whose realization is known at the beginning of time 1,
before the central bank gets to decide on whether to devalue or not. We denote the
level of domestic interest rates in case of a devaluation by  r*. For simplicity and
without any impact on the results, r* is supposed to be deterministic and constant.
Given 
d r1  and r*, the objective of the central bank at the beginning of period t=1 is
to minimize the following loss function:
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where v is the proportionate change in the exchange rate in the second period in case
of a devaluation and where the function g(r) captures the cost of high domestic interest
rates.
Note that the central bank's objective function explicitly contains the firms'
financing cost. The wis are weights which reflect the degree of influence each of these
firms has on the central bank policy. We also assume the following about the function
g:
g' > 0, g'' > 0, g(0) = 0,  ¥ = ﬁ ) ( lim r g
u r r
That is, we assume that the cost of high interest rates to the rest of the economy is
increasing and convex in the level of domestic interest rates. The third assumption is a
normalization done without any loss of generality. The last assumption ensures that
there are some levels of high interest rates that are too costly to adopt, regardless of the
financing decisions of firms that have access to foreign debt markets. This in turn
ensures that the probability of devaluation is strictly greater than zero regardless of the
firms' actions.
We make the following assumption with regard to the distribution of 
d r1 :
Assumption 2
The distribution of the random shock is such that the interest rate necessary to
maintain the current exchange rate, 
d r1 , is uniformly distributed on an interval [0,  u r ].
Finally, we make the following assumptions about the size of the devaluation:12
Assumption 3
The size of the devaluation if the central bank chooses to give up its peg, n, is a
function of 
d r0  only.
Assumption 4
d d r r 0 0 ) ( > n  and 
d d r r 0 0 2 ) ( < n
Assumption 3 is a simplifying assumption which does not affect the results but
allows for simple closed form solutions. The first part of Assumption 4 is a necessary
and sufficient condition to prevent arbitrage opportunities; the second part guarantees
that the reaction functions of both types of agents are well-behaved.
We are now ready to solve the model in the case where firms are too small to
influence the central bank's policy
III) The Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we assume that no firm manager realizes the impact that his
financing decision has on the central bank policy. Instead, firm managers behave
competitively taking the central bank's policy as given. We solve the model by
backward induction, first solving the central bank's problem, then the firms' financing
decisions.
From problem (3), we find that the cost for the central bank to devalue is:13
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while the cost to maintain the fixed exchange rate is given by:
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Since g is an increasing function of interest rates, the optimal decision of the
central bank is to devalue if and only if the interest rate necessary to maintain the peg,
d r1 , is larger than the opting-out interest rate, rm, where rm is implicitly determined by
the following equation:
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Using the fact that all firms are identical and that there is a unique maximum to the
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Equation (5) describes the reaction function of the central bank to the firms'
financing decisions. The following lemma, proved in the appendix, derives some
useful properties of that reaction function:14
Lemma 1












We now solve the firm's problem taking  rm and, hence, the probability of
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Solving problem (6), we get:
Lemma 2
i) The firm's optimum amount of foreign borrowing f(rm) is given by:




















































Putting together  Lemma 1 and  Lemma 2 , we find that the amount of foreign
borrowing by a competitive firm is increasing in the central bank's opting out interest
rate which is itself increasing in the amount of foreign borrowing by firms. This
implies a complementarity between the financing decisions of the different local firms.
If, for whatever reasons, a firm decides to borrow funds abroad, it raises the incentives
for the central bank to defend the currency, which in turn makes it more attractive for
other local firms to use foreign borrowing. We suggest that this complementarity may
be one of the determinants of the observed high foreign borrowing across the board in
Asian countries. Some initial foreign borrowing may have been caused, either by
misperception of risk or by promises of bail-out as suggested in the existing literature,
or by strategic behavior of cronies trying to influence central bank's decisions as we
suggest later in the paper. The complementarity between the decisions of the different
firms will then guarantee that other firms will optimally "imitate" the cronies, thus
explaining one of the puzzles of the high South East Asian foreign borrowing: if the
financing decisions of larger firms were motivated by moral hazard considerations,
why did smaller firms also suddenly choose to expose themselves to currency risk?16
We now put together the reaction functions of both firms and central bank to solve
for the equilibrium of the economy with competitive agents. An equilibrium is a
solution to the equation  f f r f m ˆ )) ˆ ( ( = . Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that f*(rm(f)) is a strictly
increasing concave function. This property and some straigthforward computations in
the appendix allows us to derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1




















Then no foreign borrowing is an equilibrium. Furthermore, there may also exist 0, 1
or 2 other equilibria with positive foreign borrowing
Proof : See Appendix.
Proposition 1 contains a number of results. First, and as we conjectured earlier in
the paper, the complementarity between the financing decisions of the different local
firms can be the source of multiple equilibria. As economists, we have little to say
about which of different possible  equilibria occurs in real life, so we shall not
comment any further on this part of Proposition 1 except to mention the possibility for
strategic firm managers to coordinate on the equilibrium that gives them the highest
utility. In general, one would expect that equilibrium to be the one with the most
foreign borrowing as it allows firms with access to foreign capital markets to exploit to
the maximum the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates. Of course, that17
equilibrium is also the equilibrium where firms or agents that do not have access to
foreign capital markets suffer the most as the central bank will be willing to raise
domestic interest rates to a higher level than in equilibria with a lower level of foreign
borrowing by local corporations.
However, the central result in  Proposition 1  is that even small changes in
fundamentals may move the economy from a situation where "no foreign borrowing"
is a possible equilibrium (case ii of Proposition 1, described in Figure 1) to a situation
where "high foreign borrowing" is the only possible equilibrium (case i of Proposition
1, described in Figure 2). The variable that plays the key role in determining the











1 r , which can be interpreted as a spread
between domestic and foreign interest rates, adjusted for the risk of devaluation.
13
High foreign borrowing is the unique equilibrium if and only if the risk-adjusted
spread is positive. Hence, if the economy starts at the low foreign borrowing
equilibrium a small shock to fundamentals may have a discontinuous effect on the
equilibrium composition of firms borrowing if it pushes up the risk-adjusted spread to
the positive region. Furthermore, it can easily be seen that the high foreign borrowing
equilibrium is stable so that even a temporary shock to the risk-adjusted spread may
have a permanent impact on foreign borrowing. Thus we view  Proposition 1  as
providing an essential clue to the last two main puzzles of Asian foreign borrowing:
first, why did it start picking up in the early 90's despite little change in the
fundamentals and, second, why did it keep growing despite a sharp decline in the
                                                
13 Since the world interest rate has been normalized to 0, 
d
0 r measures the spread between domestic and
foreign interest rates. n measures the percentage capital loss in the event of devaluation while
( ) u r / * r 1-  measures the probability of devaluation in case of no foreign borrowing.18
spread of domestic vs. foreign interest rates?
In next section, we finally investigate how strategic behavior on the part of firm
managers can exacerbate the impact of a small shock to fundamentals on the
equilibrium composition of firms' borrowing.
IV) The Economy with Strategic Firm Managers
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where  f is the vector of financing choices of all firms that have a positive weight in
the central bank's objective function. We look at the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium of
a game where all firms move simultaneously so that firm i takes  f  as given.
The first order condition of the firm's minimization problem is given by:
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Since the second order condition is satisfied for the competitive firm's problem, we
know by continuity that the second order condition for problem (10) is satisfied in a
neighborhood of wi = 0. Furthermore, by implicitly differentiating (11), we can find
the change in the firm's optimal amount of foreign borrowing as the firm's influence on
the central bank's decision,  wi , increases. It is straightforward to show that this
derivative is positive around wi = 0. In other words, strategic firms borrow more
abroad than competitive firms, and the more important they are for the central bank,
the more they expose themselves to currency risk. Since the central bank's reaction
function is unchanged compared to the previous section, the consequence of strategic
behavior on the part of the local firm is to shift up the concave curves in Figures 1 and
2. This in turn yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2
A larger weight of firms,  wi, in the central bank’s objective function implies the
following:
•  a milder condition on risk adjusted spread for "high foreign borrowing" to be the
only equilibrium
• a higher proportion of  unhedged foreign borrowing, f,  at the "high foreign
borrowing"  equilibrium
• a larger difference between  unhedged foreign borrowing at the "low foreign
borrowing" equilibrium and  unhedged foreign borrowing at the "high foreign
borrowing"  equilibrium
Proposition 2 shows that strategic behavior on the part of firms exacerbate the
issues we raised in the previous section. The point is of special relevance for the Asian20
crisis due to the presence of a small number of large firms that were able to get
financing on foreign capital markets and that had a special weight in the government
or the central bank's objective function (the so called "cronies"). By simply realizing
their importance for the local authorities, these firms had the incentives to strategically
increase their foreign borrowing. Other firms then followed suit given the
complementarity between firms' financing decision we pointed out in the previous
section. Thus, the presence of implicit or explicit government guarantees to bail out
firms in case of a devaluation is not necessary to explain the high foreign borrowing of
firms in South East Asia. The simple fact that some firms realized that their financing
decisions could change the central bank's decision regarding devaluation is sufficient
for that purpose.
V) CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a simple static model of the choice by a firm between
foreign and domestic financing in the presence of a risk of devaluation. We showed the
existence of a strategic complementarity between financing decisions of firms and
central bank policy, which can generate multiple equilibria. As a consequence, a small
temporary shock to fundamentals may have a large permanent impact on the
equilibrium composition of firms borrowing. Finally, strategic behavior on the part of
firms' managers exacerbates the impact on foreign borrowing.
 We conclude from these results that the large amount of foreign borrowing
observed in South East Asia may be due to an unusual moral hazard problem, i.e. to
firms trying to change the ex-ante incentives of the central bank to devalue rather than
to firms expecting ex-post bail-out in case of a devaluation. A final remark though is21
that the two types of moral hazard problems are not mutually exclusive. Even if
guarantees of ex-post bail-out cannot explain the bulk of the surge in foreign
borrowing in Asia in the mid 90's, they certainly played a role at least as far as the
banking sector is concerned. Hence, we view the argument of this paper as
complementary, and not substitutable, to those of the existing literature.22
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
i) Substituting f=0 into equation (5), it is immediate that:
rm(0) =r*
ii) is immediate from the assumption that  ¥ = ﬁ ) ( lim r g
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Note that the denominator is positive since g'(r)>0. Let N be the numerator.
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d r n  by assumption 4, we note that N'(f)<0.
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where N is given by (A2). It is clear from (A4) that since 0 ) 2 ( 0 < -
d r n , rm"(f)<0.
QED
Proof of Lemma 225
i) The first order condition for the firm's problem is given by:
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If f*(rm) >1, then the optimal amount of foreign borrowing is equal to 1. If f*(rm) < 0,
then the optimal amount of foreign borrowing is equal to 0. Hence the optimal amount
of foreign borrowing is given by:
))] ( * , 0 ( max , 1 [ min ) ( m m r f r f =
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Since  0 ) ( 0 > -
d r n  by assumption 4, we get:
 f*'(rm) >0 .
Similarly, 
d d r r 0 0 ) ( < - n  by assumption 4, hence:
f*"(rm) <0 . QED
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Then f = 0 is not an equilibrium.
Case 1: There is no F˛(0,1) such that f*(rm(F)) - F =0. Hence there is no equilibrium
in (0,1). However, by continuity, we have:
f*(rm(1)) > 1 and hence f = 1 is an equilibrium.
Case 2: There is a F˛(0,1) such that f*(rm(F)) - F =0. Hence, f=F is an equilibrium.
However, notice that the function f*(rm(f)) - f is concave, is positive for f=0 and is
equal to zero for some  f=F>0. Hence, both the function and its derivative take











< , then f = 0 is an equilibrium.
Case 1: There is no F˛(0,1] such that f*(rm(F)) - F =0. Hence there is no equilibrium
in (0,1].
Case 2: There is a F˛(0,1] such that f*(rm(F)) - F =0. Let F1 be the smallest such
number. Then F1 is an equilibrium and the derivative of f*(rm(f)) - f =0 is non negative
at F1. If F1=1, then there is no other equilibrium. If F1 < 1 and the derivative at F1 is
equal to 0, then by strict concavity, both the function f*(rm(f)) - f and its derivative take
negative values for all f>F1 and there is no other equilibrium. If  F1 < 1  and the27
derivative at F1 is positive, the same argument as for case (i) implies that thre exists











= , then f = 0 is an equilibrium and the same arguments as
above imply that there exists 0 or 1 other equilibrium. QED28
















































































































Table 1 International Claims Held by Foreign Banks- Distributed by Maturity
 and Sector





















End 1995 44.5 61.9 20.1 15.1 64.7 14.7 1.9
End 1996 55.5 61.7 21.2 12.5 66.2 19.3 1.8
Mid 1997 58.7 59.0 21.1 11.1 67.7 20.3 1.7
Malaysia
End 1995 16.8 47.2 26.4 12.4 60.4 23.9 0.3
End 1996 22.2 50.3 29.3 9.0 61.8 27.1 0.4
Mid 1997 28.8 56.4 36.4 6.4 57.1 26.6 0.6
Thailand
End 1995 62.8 69.4 41.0 3.6 55.2 37 1.2
End 1996 70.1 65.2 36.9 3.2 59.6 38.7 1.2
Mid 1997 69.4 65.7 37.6 2.8 59.5 31.4 1.5
Korea
End 1995 77.5 70.0 64.4 8.0 27.6 32.7 1.7
End 1996 100.0 67.5 65.9 5.7 28.3 34.1 2.0
Mid 1997 103.4 67.9 65.1 4.2 30.6 34.1 2.1
Sources: Bank for International Settlements and Radelet and Sachs (1998).